The Tswalu Protocol on Peace-Building
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Attached
please find ‘The Tswalu Protocol’, a guide to building peace in states
emerging from conflict. This is available above in English, French, Spanish,
Portuguese, Arabic, Dari, Russian, Chinese, German, Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian,
and Japanese.
This Protocol articulates a consensus derived from the
experience of a select group of civilian and military professionals, academics,
individual organisations, concerned government departments and heads of state
who have been at the epicentre of peacekeeping and peace-building missions.
Recognising the ad hoc nature of international responses to armed
conflict and state failure, the Protocol proposes a pragmatic and
realistic approach to improving co-ordination of the international community in
such missions. Instead of simply calling for more co-ordination, it offers a
set of principles and practical guidelines for future peace-builders.
The Protocol
is a result of a series of meetings and wider consultations, evaluating the
successes and failure of past peace-building missions from
The co-chairs and participants in the Tswalu Process
that resulted in this Protocol have noted:
-
President Paul Kagame (
-
Vice-President Francisco Santos Calderon (
-
General Carlton W Fulford (USMC rtd): ‘This
Protocol will intensify dialogue, highlight enduring lessons for future
efforts, and make way for more effective and sustainable peace-building
activities in the 21st Century. I commend it to thoughtful leaders
and committed peace advocates around the globe.’
-
State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Ib Petersen (
-
HE Patrick Mazimhaka (African Union): 'The Tswalu Protocol is the
distillation of experiences world-wide in peace-building, bringing peace to
fragile states. It offers a best practice guide in plain language to
future operations, and as such will help future peace-builders avoid the
mistakes of the past. It is essential reading for Africans, the African
-
General Sir David Richards (British Army): ‘I wish this excellent piece of work
had been available before I deployed to
And from
others:
-
President Dahir Rayale Kahin (
-
Lord Paddy Ashdown (fmr. High Representative for
-
Sir Malcolm Rifkind (fmr. UK
Foreign Secretary): ‘The Tswalu Protocol is a splendid initiative which should
remind governments as well as the public that peace and security in Afghanistan
and elsewhere will require a coherent and agreed strategy by all involved
as well as cash, military might and high ideals.’
-
Professor Barry Desker (RSIS,
-
Dr Tapani Vaahtoranta (Finnish
Institute of International Affairs): ‘Hundreds of years of combined
peace-building experience from throughout the world has been distilled to its
essence by the authors of The Tswalu Protocol - if practitioners and political
decision makers take its wisdom to heart, we will see more successful attempts
at peace-building. Nordics, too, should read it.’
-
Professor Mike Clarke (RUSI,
-
Abdulaziz Sager (Gulf Research Centre): ‘Peace-building continues to be a subject
that is too often neglected but the Tswalu Protocol offers clear and practical
suggestions that should be considered by policy-makers and specialists
world-wide.’
-
Professor Hugh White (SDSC,
-
Lt.-General (Ret) Gebretsadkan Gebretensae (CPRD,
We would
of course welcome your comments on the document. We would also be happy if you
would like to forward the Protocol onto others who might be interested,
or to post it on your websites. Please contact Leila Jack at jackl@eoson.co.za
if you require a Word version to do so. The English word version is also
attached to this end.
The
document together with the full forewords by the joint chairs and the
supporting papers will be published shortly as a RUSI Whitehall Report
compendium. Please supply your preferred physical and e-mailing addresses to
Leila Jack if you would like to receive complimentary copies.
All good
wishes – and also for 2008
Greg
Mills
Dr Greg Mills
The Brenthurst Foundation
E Oppenheimer & Son
The Tswalu Protocol*
Principles and Guidelines for Peace-Building
Missions
January 2008
1. INTRODUCTION AND AIM
The Tswalu Protocol
articulates a consensus derived from the experience of a group of civilian and
military professionals, academics, individual organisations, government
departments and heads of state who have been at the epicentre of peacekeeping
and peace-building missions. It is intended as a guide for the leaders of
future international interventions.
The Tswalu
Protocol recognises the ad hoc nature of international responses to
armed conflict and state failure. Instead of simply calling for more
co-ordination, it offers a set of principles and guidelines that future
peace-builders can use to help offset the inherent limitations of any
multilateral operation.
There are two contrasting
views on what ‘peace-building’ is. The United Nations defines peace-building as
efforts at capacity building, reconciliation and societal transformation.
Peace-building, in this view, is a long-term process that occurs after violent
conflict has slowed or stopped.
The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence describes
peace-building as political, economic, social and military measures designed to
strengthen political settlements, in order to redress the causes of conflict.
In this view, peace-building may take place while the conflict is still
ongoing, as in
The Tswalu Protocol
embraces the broader definition of peace-building enshrined in the UK Ministry
of Defence approach, understanding that peace-building efforts must sometimes
be undertaken before conflict has ended. Peace-building is thus synonymous with
‘stabilization’, the aim being to support countries emerging from conflict by
preventing or reducing violence, protecting people and key institutions,
promoting political processes which lead to greater stability, and preparing
for longer-term, non-violent politics and development.
3. WHY WE NEED A COMMON APPROACH
In the past 15 years, peace-building interventions have fallen short in
part because they lack the following characteristics:
-
Security: Some local forces oppose the peace-building
process, the host government, and international actors. This is sometimes
referred to as the ‘spoiler’ problem.
-
Strategic Planning: External actors fail to
identify an agreed end-state that provides a common purpose for their joint
intervention.
-
Directing Authority: There is no recognized
authority that can direct the various independent organizations that compose
the international effort.
-
Cultural Education and Awareness: Foreign
personnel lack sufficient knowledge of the host culture.
-
Local Capacity: Donors are constrained by the absence of national
professionals capable of executing complex public-sector projects.
-
Tolerance of Risk: The international
intervention is too slow to genuinely empower local partners due to lack
of trust and fear of failure.
-
Funding: External funding can undermine peace
settlements when not used systematically and with due consideration of the
political consequences. While the host government’s financial accountability
procedures are often inadequate, funding mechanisms can be slow, unpredictable
and temporary, making sustainability an issue.
External funding can also be guided by reporting mechanisms, auditing and
budgetary cycle requirements rather than host country needs.
-
Jobs and Basic Services: Programs for job-creation
and basic services, both crucial to consolidate peace, do not receive high
priority, and rarely generate adequate results.
4.
PRINCIPLES
The
following principles should govern every sector of the international response.
Failure to adhere to a key principle has jeopardised the success of previous
missions:
-
Local Legitimacy: However peace is secured in the
short-term, if the host government cannot win the people to its cause, the
peace-building campaign ultimately will fail.
-
Coherence of Effort: Operational
coherence in peace-building demands prioritisation and agreement at the strategic
and operational level. Prioritisation across the different sectors of the
operation requires structures for co-ordination, and the subsuming of
national/organisational interests to the needs of the host state. Securing
broad agreement on these structures before deployment is critical. In
principle, strategic coherence and co-ordination is the purview of the host
government, but in cases where transitional governments are weak, co-ordination
will require external frameworks as well. Agreement on broad strategic
objectives and co-ordination mechanisms must not over-reach and place
unnecessary constraints on the autonomy of international aid agencies.
-
Accountability: All actors involved in the
peace-building process must submit to enforceable regulatory structures –
preferably overseen by local authorities in partnership with international
partners – to ensure transparency and accountability. This includes all
international organisations and forces, private security companies, NGOs, as
well as local agencies.
-
Pragmatism: Success requires an understanding of what
is realistically attainable. The factors which should inform a realistic
assessment include the threats to the security of the process, local capacity,
the cohesion of the response, the level of international political will and
resources, and the local political culture and history.
-
Impartial Communications: Trustworthy and
impartial communication from the peace-building effort is essential to win the
trust and support of the host populations.
-
Role of Women: Women, as a particularly vulnerable
group which suffers disproportionately from conflict, are a key peace-building
and conflict mitigation asset.
-
A Common Purpose: The external actors and the local
government require a common understanding of the host country’s needs and the
long-term purpose of the international initiative before prescriptions
are devised.
5.
JOINT PRIORITISATION OF TASKS
Successful
peace-building requires the restoration of a functioning state by focusing on
security, development, and governance. These three missions are essential to
every peace-building effort and should usually be tackled in the following
order of priority:
-
Security: This is the
primary goal of any peace-building strategy. Security includes general public
safety, as well as national and international security. The intervention force
needs to seize the advantages afforded by the ‘golden hour’ – the period
immediately following the end of major hostilities – to establish a secure
environment. The peace-building actions that follow must be conducted within
the context of a stabilisation plan, integrating foreign and local efforts. The
joint military forces must operate according to an agreed common doctrine
(ideally determined before the commencement of operations). These forces must
have the training and resources to tackle post-conflict security challenges,
such as refugee flows, and to carry-out quick-impact public works projects.
Priority should be given to the rapid establishment of indigenous security and
border control forces in order to deny ‘spoilers’ freedom of movement. This
process must include early and adequate provision for the disarmament,
demobilisation and social and economic reintegration of former combatants.
-
Development: Security and
development are mutually reinforcing. The urgency is this: More than half of
post-civil war countries slide back to war within five years. The lessons of
success and failure in post-conflict countries consistently point to the need
to stimulate entrepreneurial activity and create employment, especially for
demobilised soldiers. Higher rates of economic growth decisively improve the
chances of success in peace-building. To achieve a virtuous cycle of growth,
stability and development, the strategy must prioritize the conditions that
make entrepreneurship possible, including reducing the costs of doing business,
promoting the rule of law, protecting property rights, stabilising the currency
and ensuring the predictability of tax and regulatory policy. The peace-building
effort must ensure that key ministries function, if necessary by embedding
technical and administrative support personnel. Development and aid benchmarks
should be set and adhered to, ranging from published expenditure run-downs to
targets for the ratio of aid to gross domestic product. The barriers to doing
business should be identified and tackled. Public works programmes can both
reduce unemployment and deny manpower to spoilers. Even where there is embedded
expertise, foreign visibility should be kept as low as possible, and rules
(conditionality) kept to a core, non-negotiable minimum. Care should be taken
not to shape policies according to the institutional prejudices and culture of
external actors. Equally critical for development over the long-term will be
the swift restoration of education services, which serve a vital peace-building
function in developing a shared narrative and history or in some cases
re-building collective national identities shattered by war.
-
Governance: External actions
– co-ordinated by a single, in-country authority – should be aimed at improving
the capabilities and legitimacy of local partners. Actions should be targeted
at vital areas such as the civil service and the election commission. Such
programmes should be supported by a robust communications strategy. It is
essential to create mechanisms to capture local voices and assimilate what
external actors learn from local coping strategies. Over time, donor support
for local media must give way to private media, lest the support corrode the
credibility of local outlets. Given the role of the international media in
determining the success or failure of missions, there should be a determination
of what external messages could best build public support in contributing
countries. Information operations and messaging should be proactive, consistent
and coordinated at the highest level. Internally, the promotion of inclusive
political representation and government legitimacy should underpin all
communications.
6.
IMPLEMENTING TASKS AND MAINTAINING COHESION
In
most peace-building operations, the international consensus will break down on
certain issues. Tensions will arise between the prioritisation and
implementation of tasks. Only some of these tensions will be reconcilable. (UN Security
Council Resolutions and related instructions seldom offer direction on these
issues.) No guide to peace-building can provide ready-made solutions to the
full range of dilemmas that might arise on the ground. As ever, actions must be
informed by an accurate understanding of local culture, politics, and conflict
dynamics. The international response must be agile and adaptable – but also
ensure that its actions do not violate core principles or deviate from the
agreed peace-building plan to an extent which jeopardises the mission.
The Tswalu Protocol serves as a guide for
decision-makers when circumstances present ‘hard choices’ such as these, drawn
from recent peace-building experience:
-
State-building versus reconciliation. The revival of
the state is often thought to be synonymous with reconciliation, but in fact
state-building by its nature often produces competition and conflict. It shapes
the fundamental question ‘who rules?’ and determines who controls the assets of
the state. Circumstances will dictate whether, for instance, elections ought to
be held early or postponed in the interest of maintaining peace. Yet even in
the latter case, it is important to recognise that the process of managing
political conflict over key issues can be constructive and effect wider
reconciliation.
-
Working with versus working around the state. Peace-building
operations almost always have a mandate to build state capacity. But sometimes
state authorities are obstructionist or lacking competence. In the short-term,
peace-builders may have to choose to work around rather than through state
authorities, even at the cost of weakening the very institutions they are
tasked with rebuilding. But if the necessity to ‘work around’ is due to
government malfeasance, the continued viability of the peace-building mission
should be exposed to rigorous internal scrutiny and, in extremis,
abandoned if the government ceases to be a partner.
-
State versus non-state authorities. There is often
no government presence in remote regions of failed states. International actors
are thus compelled to work with whoever constitutes ‘the authority’ (e.g.,
traditional elders, local militia leaders, self-declared mayors or governors,
clerics, and so on). Although careful assessment and local knowledge are
essential to decide among competing claims, even well-reasoned choices will
sometimes provoke local conflict.
-
Constitutions/formal rule of law versus
customary law. Formal judiciary and police functions in many
post-conflict states – especially poor ones – are usually weak. In these
instances, local communities rely principally on customary or religious law
(such as sharia) and a variety of extra-constitutional means of policing
and maintaining public order. External actors face difficult choices about
whether to recognise and work with these informal systems, or to insist on
formal judicial and police systems. This is especially challenging for ‘rule of
law’ projects. To work only with formal structures risks overlooking systems
that actually work; to abandon formal security structures risks adversely
affecting governance and development. That external peace-builders are
increasingly seeking ways to forge partnerships between weak state structures
and informal governance arrangements, such as through community policing
projects, reflects the primacy of the core principle of genuine local
empowerment.
-
Non-discriminatory awarding of contracts versus
proportional allocation by social grouping. Awarding of contracts by
peace-builders – for employment, rent, procurement and construction – is a
major source of revenue and can trigger conflict. External actors must often
choose between contract systems based purely on merit versus local
insistence on rotation of contracts by ethnic group or another criterion. Although
the latter may help to keep peace by giving each group its ‘turn’, it undercuts
the principle of merit. It may also make peace-building missions more
expensive. Nevertheless, the better of two poor options is to ameliorate the
more pernicious effects of local systems, rather than impose unwanted foreign
structures that are likely to be resented and ultimately rejected.
-
Peace versus justice. Demands for the
arrest of individuals suspected of war crimes – whether by local communities or
international human rights groups – can collide with the need to prevent
spoilers from inciting violence. Virtually every peace-building mission
encounters the ‘peace versus justice’ trade-off. Insofar as
international political will allows, decisions should be guided by the wishes
of national authorities and their populations, not by external actors.
-
Local ownership versus effectiveness. The need to place
ownership in the hands of local actors can collide with the imperative to get
things done quickly. This problem is worsened by the increasing use of
quantitative metrics to judge the performance of external peace-building
activities.
-
Civil society versus the state. A vibrant civil
society is considered an important element of a strong democracy, and local
civic groups (NGOs) are often the most effective partners for development
projects. Yet the need to channel funds through state institutions to
strengthen their capacity and legitimacy is also important. Too much aid
through local NGOs can undermine nascent state institutions, for example by
luring away the best public servants. Peace-builders must make informed choices
about balancing its partnerships with both sets of actors.
7.
TEN STEPS TOWARDS OPERATIONAL COHERENCE
The Tswalu
Protocol identifies ten measures for improving the effectiveness of
peace-building interventions.
1.
Campaign Plan: To manage the peace-building process, a ‘campaign plan’
owned and led by the local government, to which the military and other
international organisations contribute, should be devised in the earliest
phases of the intervention to create a co-ordinated and sequenced focus of
effort.
2.
Establishing Coherence: A top-level, government-led committee – a
Stabilisation Action Team (SAT), along the lines of the Policy Action Group (PAG)
established in
3.
Lead Nations: The host government is the lead nation. However, it is
vulnerable to being overwhelmed both by local demands and external offers of
assistance. Where this is threatened, external nations can be tasked in special
security and development areas, but care must be taken to ensure they remain
answerable to the host nation and do not operate independently.
4.
Building Capacity: Local empowerment should begin as soon as possible.
There needs to be clarity on what technocratic and managerial capacity is
lacking to understand what improvements and assistance are required. The
emphasis must be on institutions rather than individuals.
5.
Economic Assessment: A detailed audit of the local economy is a priority for
the early days of a peace-building mission and will help in programming donor
support. Peace-building must be based on a clear understanding of the
competitive strengths and weaknesses of the economy including the drivers of
growth and key exports.
6.
Aid Focus and Priorities: Aid must be focused and its aims prioritised. Some
things are more important than others. Attempting to do everything at once is a
guarantee of failure. External funds should be targeted at areas where some
conditions for economic success already exist – in other words, the existing
market should be reinforced rather than re-engineered.
7.
Create Employment: Attention must focus on bolstering employment and reducing
the costs of doing business – from better policy to improved physical
infrastructure. Public works programmes can assist in managing the groundswell
of high expectations that are always present when a conflict ends. These
expectations seldom subside, and indeed increase the more the government
delivers.
8.
Codes of Conduct: Private security companies are now an ever-present part of
the peace-building environment. There needs to be a change of culture to
accept, embrace and regulate their activities. Both PSCs and international
NGOs could be regulated through codes of conduct. International law needs to be
reviewed to encompass this new security landscape.
9.
Information and Messaging: A strategic messaging campaign, which aims to
deliver carefully sequenced messages to local, regional, and international
audiences is essential.
10.
Maintaining Momentum: The continuity of the external peace-building mission is
crucial to maintaining momentum, which reassures the population. This requires
longer rotations for senior military and non-military personnel.
* * * *
TSWALU PROCESS PARTICIPANTS*
Co-Chairs
Paul Kagame (HE),
President of
Francisco Santos
(HE), Vice-President of
Ib Petersen
(Hon.), State Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
Carlton Fulford
(General, USMC, rtd), US**
Panelists
Adam Cobb (Prof.), US Air Force Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, US*
Agostinho Zacarias (Dr), United Nations Development Program, Zimbabwe*
Andrew Stewart (Maj.-Gen. rtd), UK*
Ato Yemane Kidane
(Mr), Centre for Policy Research and
Brownie Samukai (Hon.), Defence Minister, Liberia*
Chris Vernon
(Colonel), Deputy Commander: IMATT,
Christopher Coker
(Prof.),
Danielle Pletka
(Ms), American Enterprise Institute, US*
David Richards
(Lt.-Gen. Sir), Commander: ISAF IX, Allied Rapid Reaction
Dominic Medley (Mr), Moby Media Group,
Dominique Orsini (Dr), Former UN & EU political adviser,
Emmanuel Karake
Karenzi (Maj.-Gen.), African Union Deputy Commander,
Frank Mugambage (Maj.-Gen.), Office of the Presidency,
Frank Pearl (Hon.), Alta
Consejería para la Reintegración, Presidencia, Colombia***
Frank Rusagara
(Brig.-Gen.), Commandant:
Jordan Ryan
(Amb.), Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary
Kelly Langdorf
(Colonel), Office of the Secretary of
Kieran Prendergast
(Sir), Former UN Under-Secretary-General,
Larry Swantner
(Colonel rtd), US
Patrick Mazimhaka
(Hon.), Deputy Chair, African
Paul Wolfowitz
(Hon.), American Enterprise Institute, US*
Peter Jouvenal
(Mr),
Rory Stewart (Mr),
Shaha Ali Riza (Ms),
Vance Serchuk
(Mr), Office of Senator
Alistair
Harris (Mr), Pursue Group,
Aziz
Hakimi (Mr), Killid Group,
Bill
Byrd (Dr),
Chris Brown
(Maj.-Gen.), Chief of Staff, ISAF IX; General Officer Commanding:
Chris Parker
(Lt.-Col. rtd), Centre for Defence & International Security Studies
(CDISS),
Dale
Lautenbach (Ms),
Dickie
Davis (Brig.-Gen.), Chief Engineer: ISAF IX; Assistant Chief Planner:
Martin Edmonds
(Prof.),
Mauro
De Lorenzo (Mr), American Enterprise Institute, US
Michelle Parker
(Ms), RAND Corporation, US
Sean McFate (Mr),
* The Tswalu Process generating
this Protocol comprised two formal meetings: on Lake Kivu in
* (* Tswalu event only); (** Kivu
event only); (*** non-attending participation)